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TRANSYLVANIAN SAXON POLITICS AND IMPERIAL GERMANY, 1871-
1876 
 
On 10 September 1876 Francis Joseph, emperor of Austria and king of Hungary, 
arrived at Hermannstadt/Nagyszeben/Sibiu train station to be greeted by a town 
bedecked with flowers and a platform full of dignitaries.1 Hermannstadt was a 
provincial military and bureaucratic centre of about 20,000 people in the south-
eastern corner of the sprawling Habsburg Monarchy. It had majority of German 
speakers (70%), traditionally known as Saxons, who were mostly adherents to the 
powerful Lutheran Church. Despite the German-Lutheran dominance, Hermannstadt’s 
population was very diverse with significant numbers of other language groups – 
Romanian (20%) and Hungarian (10%) – as well as a wide range of religious 
communities.2   
One of the many official delegates greeting Francis Joseph on the train 
platform was the Lutheran bishop Georg Daniel Teutsch (1817-1893). Subsequently, 
while viewing the local secondary school and Church, the following conversation was 
purportedly held: 
 
Francis Joseph:  It is astonishing how the [Saxon] nation has remained really so 
German at this distance and in these surroundings…. 
 
G.D. Teutsch: That is the result of the special German laws and rights 
[municipal laws] from the Crown, which have been so effective 
as a shield.3 
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It was an ironic and pointed reply from Teutsch, since Francis Joseph had just signed 
the Hungarian law that had swept away Saxon municipal autonomy and integrated the 
particular Saxon land, Königsboden/Pământul crăiesc/Királyföld, into the 
administrative system of the greater Hungarian state. At the time Teutsch had asked 
Heinrich Treitschke, the influential German journalist and historian at the University 
of Berlin, for help in publicising the Saxon cause in the recently founded Imperial 
Germany.4 Treitschke wrote back on 2 December 1876 that ‘I think it is finally time 
for the German press to speak openly about the arrogance of the Magyars and the 
subjugation (Vergewaltigung) of our loyal Saxon compatriots (Landsleute). I will 
personally say a few words in the December edition of the Preussische Jahrbücher.’5 
Despite Treitschke’s attempts and the various publications on the Saxons appearing in 
Germany around this time, there was no significant response from the German public 
or government. 	
This article investigates these two intertwined, concurrent issues. First was the 
protracted question of Saxon municipal autonomy on the Königsboden. The 
Hungarian elites, in the political ascendancy after the formation of Austria-Hungary 
in 1867, argued for a unitary, standardized, ‘modern’ nation-state encompassing all 
territories of greater Hungary, including Transylvania. Saxon legal and administrative 
traditions, which had helped maintain their language and culture over five centuries, 
were, according to this line of thinking, historical anomalies and should be gradually 
phased out. Second was the potential Saxon tactic of appealing for support from 
Imperial Germany. Aid might come either from the large German public – which had 
the potential to be a valuable source of cultural, moral and financial strength – or from 
the German government, which could apply official pressure on the Hungarian 
government through diplomatic channels.  
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These two issues are refracted through the lives, thinking and actions of G. D. 
Teutsch, his friend Jakob Rannicher (1823-1875) and the slightly younger Guido 
Baussnern (1839-1908) as they navigated the political changes – the 1867 dualist 
compromise, German unification, loss of autonomy – that would form the basis of 
Saxon politics until the outbreak of the WWI.6 Teutsch was an important focal point 
for potential help from Germany. In his formative years he had studied history, 
geography and theology in Berlin and had many contacts in Germany, mostly through 
his work as a respected medieval historian but also through the Lutheran Church, 
especially his involvement in the Gustav-Adolf Verein – an association that aided 
Protestants worldwide. Along with these German connections, Teutsch was intimately 
involved in local Saxon political and public life. As Bishop of the Lutheran Church in 
Transylvania he had direct access to Francis Joseph and to the Hungarian government 
in religious and cultural matters. He regularly stayed in Vienna and Budapest, where 
he had many friends and colleagues. An active and engaged public figure, Teutsch 
participated in associations, official appointments, cultural issues, Church visitations 
and numerous other Saxon matters. Teutsch’s rich life was an example of the 
multiple, intersecting links and loyalties within the layered web of Saxon politics.  
Jakob Rannicher – a long-term Saxon political leader – was similarly at the 
centre of Saxon life, as a politician, bureaucrat, Church figure and member of many 
associations. Over time he took a more pragmatic stance than Teutsch and argued that 
the Saxons had to accept being a very small minority in a larger Hungarian polity. 
Since Rannicher’s connections were primarily in Budapest and Vienna, Germany 
barely impacted on his political thinking. The final figure, Guido Baussnern 
represented another viewpoint. Baussnern’s opinions were changeable but he 
generally regarded Transylvania and its Saxons as an integral part of Hungary. He, in 
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turn, conceived of Imperial Germany and Hungary within the wider international 
landscape, in particular the upcoming clash between European culture and Asiatic 
barbarity. Thus Baussnern advocated a permanent alliance between Germany and 
Austria-Hungary arguing that a unitary, powerful Hungary was vital for the interests 
of Germany and the wider German Volk (people).7  
The three individuals demonstrate that it was a difficult task articulating clear 
political viewpoints while negotiating loyalties towards the German ‘Motherland’, 
Imperial Austria (whether in the forms of the monarch or the idea of a unitary state or 
Gesamtstaat), Hungarian ‘Fatherland’, Saxon ‘nation’ and local traditions.8 Teutsch 
slowly moved from mild opposition against the Hungarian government towards an 
acceptance of the general situation. Rannicher went through this process slightly 
earlier and had to endure a vote of no confidence from his Hermannstadt electors and 
considerable animus both personally and from the Saxon press in the early 1870s. 
Baussnern constantly adjusted his views as he was pulled in different directions by his 
ideas, loyalties and the changing events. In Saxon politics, changeability (both in 
opinions and political allies), disunity, individuality and specific context were ever 
present. 
Taking into account these factors and processes means rethinking the 
conceptual framework for Transylvanian Saxon history in the late nineteenth century, 
including the place of German nationalism both in Imperial Germany and in South-
Eastern Europe.9 The prevailing historiography on the Transylvanian Saxons 
emphasizes the gradual development of German nationalism coupled with growing 
links to Germany.10 Friedrich Teutsch, the son of G. D. Teutsch, played a key role in 
shaping this historiography.11 He followed in his father’s footsteps – as an extremely 
active community leader, a prominent historian and eventually also as Bishop of the 
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Lutheran Church from 1906 to 1932. This article argues that there is no teleology of 
rising German nationalism or, indeed, one specific path for Saxon history. There was 
considerable disunity amongst the Saxons, characterized by contrasting regional and 
municipal traditions, local conditions, political viewpoints, religious affiliations, 
social groupings and personal rivalries.12 In a retrospective article on 3 January 1894 
the main Saxon newspaper, the Siebenburgische-Deutsche Tageblatt (SDT) described 
the strong individualism of the Saxons as the ‘inner disease that plagues us Saxons’.13 
The pro-German viewpoint of the Teutschs (father and son) was only one viewpoint 
within the broad spectrum of Saxon politics. For some Saxons, Imperial Germany was 
merely a minor, insignificant factor in everyday politics since concrete reality was life 
under a dominant Hungarian government. These pragmatic Saxons were often drawn 
towards finding some sort of compromise or modus vivendi with the Hungarian 
government, rather than assertive German nationalism with the support of activists in 
Imperial Germany. German nationalism in Transylvanian Saxon politics was merely 
one strand amongst many and needs to be both contextualized and placed in 
perspective. 
This approach also poses questions about framing Transylvanian Saxon life 
and politics as part of a German ‘diaspora’.14 German nationalism varied across the 
Saxon spectrum and changed over time. Moreover, the long history of Saxons in 
Transylvania meant fierce pride in specific Saxon traditions and particularity. For 
many, this meant a mental universe framed by local and regional life with little 
reference to the wider German-speaking world. Of course, some Saxons (especially 
from the elite educated classes) had links with and strong sentiments towards the 
German ‘motherland’. These should not, however, obscure important Saxon 
relationships with other nationalities (often friendly and co-operative, especially with 
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Romanian speakers) and with various authorities (whether at a Transylvanian level, in 
Budapest or Vienna). Another historiographical viewpoint, which links regional 
tropes and loyalties to wider nation-building projects, similarly does not easily fit the 
Saxon example.15 Both as German speakers and Lutherans, the Saxons were very 
distinct from potential nation-building projects in the region, primarily Hungarian 
(1867 to WWI) and Romanian (post-WWI). At various points in time, different Saxon 
politicians argued that the Saxon particularity and traditions could potentially 
harmonize with and contribute to Habsburg imperial aims, Hungarian unitary 
nationalism, Romanian nation-building (after WWI) as well as pan-German dreams 
(especially in the 1930s and during WWII). Equally, Saxon particularity could lead to 
an inward focus on perpetuating Saxon life and traditions, especially when there was 
a perceived threat from a centralizing state. Rather than as nascent ‘diaspora’ or 
‘ethnic’ identity, Saxon history from the mid-nineteenth century onwards can be 
interpreted as an attempt to retain Saxon particularity and traditions under the strains 
of economic modernization and assertive, centralist state-building. Difficulties and 
disappointments coalesced into the slow, multi-directional formation of an embattled 
‘minority’ mentality. Viewed in this fashion – as the development of a minority on the 
‘margins’ – Transylvanian Saxon history can be illuminating for German, Hungarian, 
Romanian, Habsburg and Transylvanian historiographies. 
For example, the actual nature of pan-German nationalism and its importance 
both in Germany and amongst the Transylvanian Saxons takes a different hue when 
context, perspective, division and flexibility are kept in mind. The existing 
historiography, mostly dealing with the 1890s onwards, has stressed the importance of 
the pan-German nationalism in Imperial Germany and its successors – its access to 
decision-makers and its framing of the wider discourse.16 According to this line, the 
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Transylvanian Saxons were an important grouping within the widespread, fragmented 
German-speaking populations in Eastern and South-East Europe. Indeed, the 
Transylvanian Saxons were involved in the foundation of the Allgemeine Deutscher 
Schulverein and were the subject of the first sustained appeal to its members.17 Yet, 
this is only one side of the story. Both in Imperial Germany and for the Saxons, it was 
often the limitations and constraints on German nationalism – such as diplomacy, 
indifference and pragmatic politics – which prevailed.18 G. D. Teutsch’s, move from 
initial optimistic hopes for German support towards gradual sober acceptance of the 
status quo was largely prompted by general indifference towards the Saxon cause 
from the German government and the German public. 
In short, Transylvanian Saxon history in the late nineteenth century should be 
seen ‘in the round’ with its multiple loyalties and connections, disunity, changeability 
and local issues placed within the wider institutional, political, diplomatic and 
international context. If this is done, then the strand of German nationalism in 
Transylvanian Saxon politics and history is not foregrounded or placed in a pan-
German teleology. There were parallel, intersecting, overlapping strands in the 
complex Transylvanian Saxon political web, translating into changeable, varied and 
differentiated positions amongst Saxon politicians.  
 
     I 
 
For the Transylvanian Saxons, who could trace their origins in the region to the 12th 
century, the years around the 1867 Compromise were a tumultuous and defining 
period. Politics broadened in the more open environment of representative bodies, 
uncensored press and flourishing associational life. There were a number of 
	 8	
overlapping and competing levels of authority – local, sub-regional (Saxon), regional 
(Transylvania), Hungarian and Imperial. The particular configuration could be subject 
to sudden and dramatic changes. For example, in the course of just seven years from 
1860 to 1867, there were four major changes to the governmental system: from neo-
absolutism through the October Diploma, the February Patent, the suspension of the 
February Patent and, finally, to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. Each change 
could emphasis a particular level of authority, which in turn would have different and 
far-reaching consequences for Saxon politics and administration.		
Looking at the levels in turn, at the lowest was the celebrated Saxon local 
autonomy. By the nineteenth century there were eleven Saxon municipal 
administrative units (nine seats – grouped around and including Hermannstadt – and 
two districts – Kronstadt/Brașov/Brassó and Bistritz/Bistrița/Beszterce). The separate 
Saxon legal and administrative system traced its formation to medieval grants of lands 
to German settlers. This autonomy lay at the very heart of the Saxon narrative of 
origins. Each municipality had its traditional privileges covering the administration of 
justice, the appointment of officials, economic matters and internal regulations.19 In 
general, the citizens would meet at regular public meetings to decide on local matters 
and to elect their own Mayor and officials. Demographics differed between 
municipalities, but generally consisted of majority Saxon populations with substantial 
Romanian and Hungarian minorities. While there was a common experience of local 
autonomy, the historical traditions were diverse, as were the social and economic 
conditions. For example, in his evocative memoirs, Karl Ernst Schnell described 
Kronstadt, a bustling business and trading town, as dominated by the local Freemason 
lodge.20 In Bistritz, by contrast, important decisions were made in the Trade 
Association (Gewerbeverein).21 Hermannstadt’s focal point was the Lutheran Church 
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and its circle (especially around Teutsch), reflecting its institutional and bureaucratic 
character. The shared formal German language (Hochdeutsch) provided a limited 
bridge for the various Saxon towns and localities, since the local spoken Saxon 
dialects were often very different, to the point of mutual incomprehensibility.22 
The next level was the Universitas Saxonum that consisted of elected 
representatives from the eleven municipalities meeting as a collective body under the 
aegis of an elected Saxon Count. This unified legal and administrative area was 
officially recognised and codified by the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus in 1476 
and often carried the name of Königsboden. For much of its existence it was 
responsible for taxes and military recruits as well as constituting the highest form of 
legal court for the territory. There had been notable disruptions to the Universitas in 
the 1780s under Joseph II and the 1850s under neo-absolutism, both times due to 
centralizing pressures from Vienna. The combination of municipal autonomy and the 
Universitas formed the bedrock of specific Saxon institutions and Saxon self-
perception as a distinct people and nation.  
Turning to the level of Transylvania, the region had a long and distinct history 
as a political and administrative unit within, successively, the medieval Kingdom of 
Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy. The key representative 
body was the Transylvanian diet. Since 1437 the Transylvanian Saxon burghers had 
been included as one of the three privileged estates (or natio) – the other two being 
the Hungarians nobles and the Székely border guards (who spoke a form of 
Hungarian). The Romanian population were traditionally not represented as a 
corporate body in the diet, even though they were the most populous language 
grouping within Transylvania. The approximate figures for Transylvania according to 
the 1880 census were Romanian-speakers 57%, Hungarian-speakers 30%, German-
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speakers 10%. It should be kept in mind that many inhabitants were bilingual or 
trilingual and national categories were not clear or fixed.23 In the nineteenth century, 
the diet had declined in importance and was subject to manipulation from the two 
higher levels of authority – the kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg monarch. 
From the mid nineteenth century until 1867 both tried to assert power over 
Transylvania, often through the diet, and the Saxons were caught in this power 
struggle. This triangular relationship of Transylvania, Hungary and Imperial Austria 
dominated, even defined, Saxon political life through to the early 1870s. There were, 
for example, two very different Transylvanian diets convened in succession during 
the turbulent mid-1860s. The first was called by the centralist Viennese government 
and met in Hermannstadt. Romanian participation, for the first time, was facilitated, 
while the Hungarian politicians boycotted.24 The second was convened to reconcile 
Hungary with the Monarch and the central state. This diet had an overwhelming 
Hungarian majority and, significantly, met in Klausenburg/Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár. It 
had just one item on the agenda: Transylvanian union with Hungary.  
Amidst the many changes, Jakob Rannicher was emerging as a respected 
Saxon political leader. During the 1848-9 revolutions, Rannicher had fled to Vienna 
where he joined the Imperial civil service. In 1856 he returned to Transylvania as 
secretary to the governor, while simultaneously being envoy of the education and 
religious ministry (run from Vienna) and a member of the upper consortium of the 
Transylvanian Lutheran Church. Rannicher, along with his friend Teutsch, 
participated in the long genesis of the 1861 Protestant constitution for the 
Transylvanian Lutheran Church. As an active politician he was elected to the 
Hermannstadt diet, where he took a leading role especially in promoting Romanian 
interests, and to the Viennese parliament from 1863 to 1865. At the same time, he was 
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heavily involved in the revived Universitas Saxonum. Rannicher’s multitude of 
positions and tasks was typical for a Saxon politician – Teutsch was another similar 
example – and hardly surprising given the many levels of government and 
administration as well as the importance of the Lutheran Church.  
At the Klausenburg diet of 1865 Rannicher gave the majority Saxon address, 
where he raised concerns about Transylvania’s incorporation into Hungary. Rannicher 
and the Saxons feared that ‘[i]n an assembly [a parliament in Budapest] where our 
fate will be decided, the lonely voices of the Saxon and Romanian representatives will 
disappear unnoticed in the desert.’25 Hungarian pressure for Transylvania union 
provoked the formation of rough political groupings. The ‘Old Saxons’ (including 
Rannicher and Teutsch) looked to Vienna and argued for a defense of traditional 
Saxon autonomy, principled opposition to Hungarian centralization and a continued 
belief in an overarching Gesamtösterreich (integrated Austrian state). By contrast, the 
‘Young Saxons’ (which would eventually include the young Guido Baussnern) 
advocated co-operation with the Hungarian elites on the basis of progressive reforms, 
liberal tolerance and a commitment to the construction of the Hungarian state.26 There 
was often bitter conflict between the two sides including personal attacks, stone 
throwing and street fighting, even though individuals like Baussnern would maneuver 
between groupings and even switch allegiances. The split between ‘Old Saxons’ and 
‘Young Saxons’ was exacerbated by a contest over railway routes. Throughout the 
1860s and 1870s there were discussions in parliament and official circles, first in 
Vienna then in Budapest, about the railway route from Vienna-Budapest to Bucharest 
(and the Black Sea).  There were two possible routes: one going through Kronstadt 
(the stronghold of the ‘Young Saxons’), the other going through Hermannstadt 
(dominated by ‘Old Saxons’). This had been a major topic of Saxon politics for two 
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decades until the Hungarian government eventually decided for the Kronstadt route in 
1868/9.27 Rannicher, in particular, was heavily involved in the debate through the 
various representative bodies and in Budapest.28  
Baussnern was only just beginning his political career but wrote prolifically on 
the events of the time. Already he was showing a capacity for sudden changes of 
opinion. In 1866, amidst the real possibility of union with Hungary and a dualist 
settlement, he published a pamphlet in favour of a federal, decentralised system 
within an overarching Austrian Gesamtstaat allowing the Saxons considerable 
autonomy – a position similar to Rannicher’s.29 In his next brochure, published 
shortly after the Compromise, Baussnern changed opinion and gave qualified support 
to the recently installed dualist system.30 His explanation was that one simply had to 
accept history’s judgment; in this case, the dualism had favoured the Germans and 
Magyars. Baussnern justified this result by praising the level of culture and 
civilisation of both peoples, especially in comparison with the Slavs and Romanians.31 
This idea of a natural harmony between German and Hungarian interests would 
become a constant of his political thinking through his many changes of opinion.32  
Teutsch was also negotiating the many changes to Saxon life. He was involved 
in nearly every major Saxon issue of the time. Compared to Rannicher and Baussnern, 
Teutsch had the most direct contact with Germany and the strongest attachment to its 
culture and learning. This was largely through his academic contacts as a historian 
and his frequent visits to Germany. His most important historical writing appeared in 
the 1850s, including edited documentary collections and the hugely influential and 
popular Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen. All of his historical research 
conceived the Transylvanian Saxons as one entity, while also emphasizing the links to 
the German ‘Motherland’.33 In 1858 Teutsch returned to Germany for the first time 
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since his student days. He wrote excitedly that ‘Now my burning, long held wish has 
been fulfilled – I am again in Germany … our spiritual homeland.’34 In the 1850s 
Teutsch was a teacher at the secondary school (Gymnasium) of his hometown 
Schässburg/Sigișoara/Segesvár. On 21 April 1863 Teutsch was elected priest in 
Agnetheln/Agnita/Ongenitlea, a small town between Hermannstadt and Schässburg. 
Shortly afterwards, on 19 September 1867 he was elected bishop of Hermannstadt and 
leader of the Lutheran Church in Transylvania, the highest ecclesiastical position in 
the Saxon community. In his confirmation audience with Francis Joseph in Vienna, 
Teutsch mentioned the new dualist system and hoped that the Saxons’ living 
conditions would not be touched. Francis Joseph replied: ‘Certainly, certainly’.35  
At the outset of dualism, the Hungarian government pursued a cautious, 
differentiated policy towards the Saxons.36 In the Nationalities Law (1868) cultural 
and linguistic rights were recognised, though premised on a unitary state with 
Hungarian as the official language. The Union Law (1868) formally incorporating 
Transylvania into Hungary provided for equality of religions and promised a separate 
law to secure Saxon self-administration on the Königsboden. The Saxon 
representatives in the Budapest parliament, including Rannicher as one of the leaders, 
sat with the main government party, known informally as the Deák Party (after the 
Hungarian political leader and architect of the 1867 Compromise, Ferenc Deák). One 
of Deák’s closest associates, the cultural and religion minister József Eötvös – a 
prominent intellectual and a liberal parliamentarian – offered Rannicher a post in the 
education ministry, which he accepted. In a letter to Teutsch, Rannicher explained 
that he wanted to protect Saxon schools and ‘the “flourishing” German oasis behind 
the mountains [in Transylvania]’.37 Increasingly he viewed the autonomy of the 
Saxon church and schools as vital protection against the prevailing attitude in 
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Budapest about ‘unity of the Empire, nation, language, supremacy, centralisation’; in 
other words, the construction of a unitary Hungarian nation-state.38 Within the 
education ministry Rannicher worked on drafts of the elementary school law, while in 
parliament he negotiated with Deák about the exact terms of the nationality law. He 
was also assiduously learning Hungarian, which progressed quickly, to the extent that 
he could soon give long speeches in parliament.  
While Rannicher tried to accommodate to the realities of Hungarian 
dominance, Teutsch believed the dualist system would not last and continued to lay 
his hopes in a constitutional, federalist Gesamtstaat with Saxon autonomy.39 He, too, 
fought for Church autonomy and improvements in the school system, while remaining 
extremely influential behind-the-scenes in Saxon politics. One example was his 
encouragement for the foundation of the Saxon newspaper, the Siebenbürgisch- 
Deutsche Wochenblatt (SDW), the forerunner of the SDT. The first issue on June 
1868 contained a programme that reflected Teutsch’s position. The newspaper aimed 
to secure the rights and the preservation of the Saxon people and proclaimed proudly 
that the Saxons ‘are German and want to remain German’, yet lived in ‘another home’ 
and would never be German citizens.40 Teutsch’s influence extended to a regular 
Thursday evening reading group that met at the Bishop’s residence for cigarettes and 
conversation, a ritual Teutsch had initiated as a schoolteacher in Schässburg.41 
Teutsch assembled the best of Saxon intelligentsia around him and dominated the 
discussions. The political talk was of the fight between Magyars and Saxons. Teutsch 
often asked the journalist Karl Wolff about what the ‘bad Magyars’ were writing. 
Even here, in the privacy of his home and surrounded by fellow Saxons, there were 
differences of opinion. Wolff, who would take over editorship of the SDW when it 
became a daily, was described as knowledgeable, nationalist-minded and ready to 
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fight. By contrast, Friedrich Müller, the Hermannstadt local priest, and Oskar Meltzl, 
an economist and politician, were more conciliatory.42    
 
II 
 
Around the time of the Franco-Prussian war and subsequent German unification in 
1870-1, the Hungarian government was in the gradual process of constructing and 
securing the dualist system through numerous laws and institutions. As Rannicher 
observed, the principles of state sovereignty and ‘modernization’ were often invoked 
to justify the goal of building a unitary Hungarian state. In general, this meant policies 
of standardisation and Magyarisation, though there was room for negotiation and the 
rates of implementation varied from sector to sector, region to region. Increasingly, 
Saxon rights, traditions and everyday life were affected. This was the situation when 
Wilhelm Wattenbach, a medieval historian at Heidelberg University, stayed with 
Teutsch during the summer of 1869. Upon Wattenbach’s return to Heidelberg, he held 
a series of lectures about the Saxons.43 The final published pamphlet mixed popular 
history, political commentary and traveller’s impressions. After a cursory overview of 
Saxon history, Wattenbach portrayed the current situation as Saxon defence of their 
church and schools against an assertive Hungarian state.44 The Saxons, according to 
Wattenbach, were merely asking for the necessary freedoms and independence to 
remain Germans – which any Hungarian Comitat (county) could demand. His 
characterization of ‘Hungarian freedom’ was scathing, describing it as freedom solely 
for Magyars plus ‘arbitrary domination over others’.45 Ultimately, Wattenbach 
recognized that in national matters the Saxons were not strong enough to confront the 
Magyars, yet pointed to the Church and education as the keys to retaining German 
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consciousness and a sense of community. He argued for a vigorous Saxon defence of 
their German character and continued educational links to Germany.46 Undoubtedly, 
his ideas had been shaped by conversations with Teutsch.  
Many universities in German had long and close links with Transylvanian 
Saxons since study at the Protestant Universities of Heidelberg, Göttingen, Tübingen, 
Leipzig, Jena, Halle and Berlin was a common route for the Saxon elite, especially the 
priests.47 In the 1860s and early 1870s Heinrich Treitschke was a professor at 
Heidelberg (he would later move to Berlin in 1874) and a close friend of Wattenbach. 
It is possible that Wattenbach initiated Treitschke’s contact with Teutsch. In any 
event, Treitschke began commissioning and publishing essays on the Transylvanian 
Saxons in the Preussischer Jahrbücher, where he was an editor. In a letter dated 15 
April 1872 Treitschke wrote to Teutsch that: ‘I hold it as our duty to support the 
threatened Deutschtum (Germandom) in the Carpathians ... the Transylvanian 
problem is as good as unknown in the [German] Reich’.48 In many of his subsequent 
letters Treitschke mentioned the lack of knowledge in Germany concerning the 
Transylvanian Saxons and the general situation in Hungary.49  
Treitschke was, in fact, a keen observer of the Habsburg Monarchy, despite 
his historic advocacy of a Prussian-led ‘small Germany’. In December 1871, 
Treitschke wrote a perceptive long article entitled ‘Austria and the German Reich’, 
where he called the Saxons ‘the hardest working of the German peoples (Stamme) in 
the South-East’.50 The article contained two potentially contradictory ideas that would 
dominate Treitschke’s thinking on Hungary and the Transylvanian Saxons. First was 
the diplomatic consideration of the Habsburg Monarchy as an integral, stabilizing 
force in the region and in Europe. This implied German non-interference in 
Hungarian domestic affairs. Second was the German cultural perspective that the 
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Magyars were abusing their power and placing undue pressure on the Transylvanian 
Saxons.51 This implied possible intervention on behalf of German-speaking 
minorities. These two strands remained delicately balanced in Treitschke’s mind. In 
conclusion Treitschke counseled non-interference by the German government.52 
Thus, around the time of German unification, three themes in German thinking 
on the Transylvanian Saxons were forming. First, there were the notions of a wider 
German world based on language, culture and religion. Common terms used by 
Wattenbach, Treitschke and others, such as ‘Motherland’, ‘German Volk’ (people), 
‘German culture’, ‘German science’ and ‘Western civilization’ all referenced this 
framework of thinking. There were a number of nebulous concepts behind this 
viewpoint. For example, there were ideas of a shared linguistic and cultural heritage 
based on a perceived integrated, medieval, Christian German-speaking people.53 
Wattenbach in particular portrayed the Saxons as part of the great medieval 
colonizing mission by Christian, German-speakers.54 Layered onto this conception 
was the shared German heritage of the Protestant Reformation, since the vast majority 
of Saxons were Lutheran. An additional layer came from the idea of an enlightened, 
cultured, scientific-minded, German-speaking elite community. Teutsch’s attitudes 
incorporated these different aspects to form an idealized image of a common, 
progressive, humanist, Christian German cultural world encompassing the 
Transylvanian Saxons as proud, distinguished representatives in the East.55 A second 
theme in German attitudes to the Transylvanian Saxons was the rising importance of 
diplomatic considerations.56 The formation of Imperial Germany fundamentally 
changed the European state system. Germany, forged after three wars and situated in 
the heart of Europe, had to negotiate a charged situation. Attitudes towards distant, 
isolated communities such as the Transylvanian Saxons became increasingly refracted 
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through official state interests and channels.57 This pragmatic German policy, coupled 
with Vienna’s passivity under dualism and effective ceding of domestic matters to 
Budapest, meant the Saxons were largely left alone by Vienna and Berlin. The third 
and final theme was indifference.58 The German public never really adopted the 
Saxon cause, despite attempts to rouse interest and sympathy. There were a number of 
factors to explain this indifference. The German public had a multitude of pressing 
issues in the wake of unification. Moreover, the German government did not 
articulate any official position on the Transylvanian Saxons and maintained a neutral 
silence. Treitschke struck a resigned tone in letter dated 23 April 1875: ‘What should 
we do against [Magyar arrogance]?’, he wrote. Neither the German public nor official 
opinion wanted any intervention in internal Hungarian affairs.59  
These three themes of cultural affinity, diplomatic considerations and general 
indifference also influenced Saxon attitudes towards the new Imperial Germany. This 
was illustrated in the Saxon discussions of (or lack of interest in) the Prussian victory 
over France and subsequent unification of Germany. For some, such as Teutsch, these 
events were an example of what the German spirit could achieve or in the words of an 
exultant SDW: ‘judgment day for France had arrived ... [and] never has world history 
spoken such a harsh, destructive judgment’.60  The newspaper continued in this vein: 
The greatest [result] is that in the dark night of the present, a new hope has 
been illuminated. The true, deep consecration of this momentous action is that 
the united spirit of the German people (der geeinigte deutsche Volksgeist) – 
the soul of this living people and creative, cultural power – has defeated, with 
bloody punishment, the dark demons of Gallic arrogance and Napoleon self-
deification which had wanted, with deep scorn, to kick into the sand all future 
demands of [German] self-respect.61 
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Teutsch shared these opinions and wrote a number of celebratory articles for the 
SDW.62 For him and the SDW, the German spirit was associated with progress, 
civilisation and truth.  
Guido Baussnern followed events closely and took a broad geopolitical 
perspective coupled with cultural arrogance. He outlined his viewpoint in a passionate 
appeal to Hungary at the outset of hostilities between Prussia and France. For 
Baussnern, the key was that Russia and the Slavs in general were Hungary’s real 
enemies. With the formation of Austria-Hungary, the Monarchy was now, according 
to Baussnern, internally structured along the lines of Germans and Magyars against 
the Slavs. A strong, united Germany would serve as the natural ally of Austria-
Hungary against pan-Slavism. In other words, ‘Hungary’s interests in relation to 
Eastern Europe coincide with those of Germany’s – Hungary’s natural ally is 
therefore Germany and Hungary’s future depends on the natural unification of the 
German people’.63 In conclusion, Baussnern evoked the familiar struggle of European 
civilization against Asiatic barbarism. Thus Baussnern, like Treitschke, places the 
Transylvanian Saxons in the wider perspective of European diplomacy and the 
historical process of clashing peoples and cultures. For Baussnern there was no 
apparent contradiction between Saxon, German and Hungarian loyalties since in geo-
political terms a strong Hungary would be good for the German state and people.  
Yet, as the Saxons celebrated both the victory over France and the unification 
of Germany, these events had little concrete effects on Saxon political or daily life. 
The unification of Germany, while welcomed, did not substantially obtrude into the 
practical issues of adjusting to a dominant Hungarian government. The mental 
horizons of many Saxons, including politicians, continued to be their locality and 
region in relation to the larger Hungarian polity and, more distantly, the Monarch in 
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Vienna. For example, in Jakob Rannicher’s correspondence around this time, there is 
barely a mention of the Franco-Prussian War or the unification of Germany. Instead 
there are long discussions of educational policies, official appointments, ongoing 
divisions within the Saxon community, railway politics, parliamentary tactics, the 
upcoming municipal law, local business initiatives, Church affairs and various 
personal matters.64 Rannicher was absorbed in daily political matters and did not 
consider any potential support from Germany or diplomatic pressure on the Budapest 
government. 
     
     III 
 
Throughout this time there was intense discussion about the Hungarian government’s 
reform to the autonomous institutions and practices on the Saxon Königsboden.65 This 
issue would dominate Saxon politics for the next five years and would initiate the first 
concerted Saxon appeal to Imperial Germany. It illustrates the new matrix of Saxon 
politics: a powerful Hungarian government, an acquiescent Monarch in Vienna and 
the potential outside influence from Imperial Germany. 
In the years leading up to 1876, the Hungarian government produced 
successive drafts for legislation concerning the Königsboden, generally in the 
direction of increased centralisation in an attempt to create a standardised, unified 
political and administrative system across greater Hungary.66 Under the 1868 Union 
Law and the 1870 Municipal Law, Transylvania (including the Saxon Königsboden) 
was to be subject to its own law. After much manoeuvring and outlining of respective 
positions, a government draft was published in March 1871. The SDW, representing 
the ‘Old Saxon’ viewpoint, opposed the draft and based its arguments on legal 
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precedents and continuity.67 On the other hand, the ‘Young Saxon’ leaders, including 
Guido Baussnern, portrayed themselves as a liberal, democratic party willing to co-
operate with the Hungarian government.68 The Universitas Saxonum met to prepare 
for consultation over the upcoming reforms. Under new Universitas electoral 
regulations, decreed by the Hungarian government, many more Romanian voters were 
included than before. Coupled with the subtle influence of the newly appointed Saxon 
Count Moritz Conrad, this produced a slight pro-Hungarian majority consisting of 
‘Young Saxons’, sympathetic Romanians and one Hungarian. Baussnern celebrated 
the majority in the Universitas as the ‘solid advocacy of all nationalities for the 
Hungarian state idea’.69  
Almost immediately, however, Baussnern began to move towards opposition, 
possibly concerned over the lack of consultation and increased Hungarian centralist 
sentiment. Baussnern would eventually become a strong voice against the 
government’s Königsboden law. At the same time he was also attempting to achieve 
some political unity within the Saxon camp, especially in light of the upcoming 1872 
parliamentary elections. Baussnern described his position in a personal letter: ‘I have 
not become an “Old Saxon”, but I am no longer a “Young Saxon”. Rather I am only a 
Saxon and it is my conviction that this standpoint must be the one of every loyal son 
of our [Saxon] nation, if our unity shall become a reality.’70 Considering the division 
and rancour within the Saxon camp, it is no surprise that political unity and a common 
programme proved difficult to achieve. There were numerous discussions and drafts 
(including one from Baussnern) in the early months of 1872. After weeks of meetings 
in the small town of Mediasch/Mediaș/Medgyes a common programme was 
eventually issued on 5 June 1872.  
The Mediasch programme was an awkward mix of ideas.71 The dualist system 
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and Transylvania’s union with the Hungarian state were not directly challenged; 
indeed there were clauses calling for a true Rechtstaat (rule of law), full realisation of 
the 1868 Nationality Law and general good governance. Saxon autonomy and the 
continued unity of the Universitas were defended as compatible with a modern, 
progressive Hungarian state. Further clauses called for municipal and local reforms in 
accordance with Clause 10 of the 1868 Union Law including open elections for 
important official positions rather than appointments by the government. Stress was 
laid on the Universitas as the correct party for negotiations about any administrative 
reforms. The Mediasch programme contained nothing about relations with Imperial 
Germany or support from the wider German-speaking world. 
Rannicher had participated in some of the background discussions to the 
Mediasch Programme but was preoccupied by his work within the system. He struck 
a moderate tone in his report to his electors on 16 June 1872. He talked about 
Hungary’s modernisation in the direction of Western culture, but described the 
municipality law as the ‘sword of Damocles’ hanging over the Saxon people.72 Upon 
the Budapest parliament convening in September 1872, the Saxon delegates, who as a 
bloc still remained in the government party, presented the Mediasch Programme to 
Deák.73 The moderates in Deák’s party were still prepared to listen to Saxon 
viewpoints and the final terms had not been settled, though the Minister of the 
Interior, Vilmos Tóth, was preparing a new draft. Here were the everyday realities of 
Saxon politics – fragile unity masking deep internal divisions, while in negotiation 
with a powerful Hungarian government. 
By November, the Saxon delegates in Budapest were already disagreeing 
about tactics and starting to go their separate ways.74 Some such as Teutsch, the SDW 
and the committed ‘Old Saxons’ stressed historical rights and promises. This was 
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often coupled with an appeal to the German government and public for support. 
Others such as Rannicher wanted to work from within the Deák party to obtain some 
concessions for the Saxons. Previously, for example with the 1868 Nationalities Law, 
Rannicher had spoken privately with Deák, who had been prepared to compromise.75 
These tactics did not involve any appeal for wider support from the German-speaking 
world since this may displease the Hungarian government. Another camp was the 
‘Young Saxons’, who believed wholeheartedly in the Hungarian state idea and 
conceived Saxon life largely as a personal matter, subsumed within a greater 
Hungary.   
Teutsch, in particular, began to place hope in Imperial German support. In the 
early to mid 1870s he published a number of essays, anonymously, in Treitschke’s 
Preussische Jahrbücher trying to mobilize German official and public opinion. The 
first essay appeared in 1872 portraying the Saxons as an upstanding Bürgervolk 
(citizenry), progressive Protestants and proud Germans.76 Teutsch was highly critical 
of the present Hungarian state claiming it was ‘a chauvinist power which struggled for 
sole dominance, which wanted to destroy the presence and the roots of the vigorous 
German tree’.77 The Hungarian state idea, which professed liberalism and reform, in 
fact operated as absolute parliamentary control over the state with no rights for the 
minorities. The Saxons, for instance, were ‘denounced as traitors to the Fatherland 
and as reactionaries’.78 In conclusion, Teutsch called for support from the 
‘Motherland’ (a term he constantly used for Germany) but also peaceful co-existence 
with the Hungarian state based on respect for Saxon rights and laws.79 There was an 
echo in certain journals, such as Die Grenzboten, which published two articles 
mirroring the ideas in Teutsch’s essay.80  
In the meantime, Hungarian politics was in a state of flux moving in the 
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direction of increased centralization and more strident nationalism. Many of the older, 
more moderate Hungarian political leaders were leaving the national political stage 
for various reasons. Gyula Andrássy, the first Prime Minister under dualism, became 
foreign minister of Austria-Hungary in 1871. József Eötvös died in the same year. 
Deák retired from public affairs in 1873 while his supporters were moving towards 
Kálmán Tisza’s more assertive, Hungarian nationalist Left-Centre party, eventually to 
fuse in 1875. Gyula Szapáry, a distinguished technocratic liberal politician, took over 
as Interior Minister on 10 March 1873 and made reform to the Königsboden an urgent 
matter of state. Parallel to Hungarian party consolidation, many Saxons were 
strengthening their opposition to the government. In the Universitas there was now a 
solid majority insisting on continued Saxon autonomy. Baussnern, for instance, had 
changed sides and now strongly opposed Magyarisation in general and the specific 
reforms to the Königsboden.81 The Universitas presented two majority petitions 
(December 1872 and December 1873) to the Hungarian Interior Minister asserting the 
Saxon oppositional viewpoint. Essentially, the petitions affirmed the unity of the 
eleven Saxon municipalities as represented in the Universitas, the election of officials 
(rather than appointments) and continued self-administration. The 19 December 1873 
petition, in particular, stressed that any changes should be negotiated through the 
Universitas and the municipalities.82 In an open letter dated 23 May 1874 Baussnern 
wrote of ‘the almost unbearable conditions …that have generated the feeling of bitter 
disappointment’.83 These strong sentiments placed considerable pressure on the Saxon 
parliamentary representatives in Budapest to leave the fracturing Deák Party and enter 
into official opposition.  
 A number of heated meetings both in Budapest and in Saxon towns about 
moving into open opposition placed enormous pressure from below on the Saxon 
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parliamentary representatives. Divisions amongst Saxons were particularly evident 
within localities.84 This was, to a large extent, a continuation of the bitter struggle 
between ‘Old Saxons’ and ‘Young Saxons’, though some individuals had swapped 
sides, like Baussnern. Prominent ‘Young Saxons’ such as Friedrich Wächter, a 
representative from Kronstadt, and Karl Fabritius, a Priest from Schässburg, were not 
prepared to break with the government party, despite considerable pressure from 
sections of the Saxon public and press. Both Wächter and Fabritius would eventually 
vote in support of the 1876 Königsboden law. Jakob Rannicher and his moderate 
position suffered amidst the rancour and hardening of stances.85 In March 1874 when 
ten Saxons finally left the Deák Party, Rannicher remained. At a meeting in 
Hermannstadt his actions were denounced by his electorate and there was an effective 
vote of no confidence in him. Allegations were made that Rannicher’s position in the 
education ministry meant he could not challenge the government. Rannicher denied 
this. Privately, Rannicher counselled moderation, flexibility and understanding with 
the Hungarian government and politicians, rather than the desperate politics of 
ultimatums.86 In a long letter dated 31 March 1874, Rannicher summed up his views 
in the following words: ‘We Saxons are not in the position to burn the bridges behind 
us’.87 Rannicher instinctively looked to negotiate with the state authority – whether in 
Vienna or Budapest – rather than turning outwards to Germany for support. Rannicher 
described the oppositional stance as useless isolation ‘finally turning one’s back and 
breaking all bridges to a possible understanding’.88 He would die shortly afterwards of 
tuberculosis on 8 November 1875, greatly troubled by the events of the last two years.  
In the heated political environment, many Saxons placed their hopes on 
possible help or influence from Imperial Germany. At one of the preparatory meetings 
in November 1873 about the SDW becoming a daily newspaper, Baussnern proposed 
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a clause on promoting and caring for the spiritual connection between the Saxon 
people and Germany.89 It was adopted by the meeting. The editorship was offered to 
Karl Wolff and, in the lead article of the SDT’s first edition, he struck a new note of 
passion. He wrote of ‘forced language use’ (Sprachenzwang) and the ‘hot blooded 
chauvinism of the Magyars’.90 Wolff counselled a defence of municipal and Church 
autonomy in the struggle ‘for the just existence (Dasein) of a people’.91 Around this 
time there was a concerted wave of publications in Imperial Germany about the 
Transylvanian Saxons. Teutsch’s personal connections were important. He published 
another article in Treitschke’s Preussischer Jahrbücher, while a new German edition 
of his general history was reprinted (arranged by Wattenbach through his publisher 
Samuel Hirzl).92  
Two substantial books on the Transylvanian Saxons intended for the general 
German public also appeared in 1874, including one anonymously written by Guido 
Baussnern. In a private letter Baussnern described his hope that the ‘moral 
intervention of the German Volk would settle matters in favour of the small Saxon 
house.’93 The book begins with Baussnern expressing his disappointment at 
Hungarian policy. After the great hopes of 1867 and the reputation of Hungarians as 
lovers of freedom, the subsequent years had witnessed the Pest parliament relentlessly 
pursuing a policy of Magyarisation.94 Baussnern argued that: 
[The Saxon nation] demands nothing more or less than the recognition of 
those rights, which are inscribed in inextinguishable words within the 
foundation documents of each nation and nationality, and which are also 
written in the modern spirit in the laws - the right to live and to develop in 
accordance with its own character.95 
The desirability of assimilating into Magyar culture and society was firmly rejected. 
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Baussnern confidently proclaimed the Magyar cultural level as being far below that of 
the German people.96 Why would a Saxon want to assimilate into Magyar culture and 
society? Baussnern asked. It was not a world language, had no high literature, nor 
culture, nor ethics, nor administrative talent, he asserted.97 There was no Shakespeare, 
Byron, Voltaire, Mirabeau, Schiller, Goethe or Humboldt!98  Certainly, the 
Hungarians could offer a love of freedom, Baussnern conceded, yet there was also a 
tendency towards totalitarianism. Baussnern, under the cloak of anonymity, called 
Magyarisation ‘a formal war of extermination against all’.99 In fact, he was so worried 
over these strong statements that he expected to be jailed for the publication of the 
brochure if his identity was revealed.100 Nevertheless, Baussnern had not lost all hope 
of cooperation and concluded his book by calling for a common Magyar-German 
cultural mission to the East.101  
The other book came from the pen of Franz Löher – a native of Paderborn, a 
veteran German democrat from 1848 and now a respected historian in Munich. Löher 
had also written the foreword to Baussnern’s book. Löher’s own book, entitled ‘Die 
Magyare und andere Ungarn’, condemned the recent tyranny of the government and 
its policy of Magyarisation.102 Löher characterised the Magyar attitude as follows: ‘I 
am in charge of this land. Learn the Magyar language if you want to speak in public 
then leave your mother tongue at home’.103 Yet for Löher (and for Baussnern) this 
made little sense because the existential threat to Hungary came from Russia and in a 
future battle of the races (Völker) only Germany could protect Hungary.104 Indeed 
Löher argued for increased trade and general links between Germany and Hungary.105  
Löher’s book provoked a spirited response in a brochure entitled Der Kampf 
der Siebenbürger Sachsen für die Überreste des Feudalwesens, which set out the 
Hungarian case.106 The Transylvanian Saxons were portrayed as uncommitted to the 
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Hungarian state idea, while other German-speakers in Hungary, more open to 
assimilation and freedoms, were praised as the “most patriotic, hard-working, loyal 
sons of Hungary”.107 Saxon antiquated privileges and special rights were contrasted 
with the Hungarian aim of a modern legal system based on liberal institutions and the 
equality of rights. As evidence of Hungarians’ modernising convictions, the author 
cited the voluntary end to Hungarian noble tax exemptions, which had been in 
accordance with the spirit of the age.108 The Universitas Saxonum, on the other hand, 
was branded a ‘mummy from medieval times’.109 No mention was made of the 
contradiction, pointed out by an article in the Preussische Jahrbücher that the 
Hungarians had relied on historical rights in their fight against Vienna yet condemned 
traditional Saxon rights as outdated privileges.110 As for appeals to fellow Germans, 
Saxon politics within Hungary was, according to the brochure, not a matter for 
Imperial Germany or its people.111 
The German government indeed remained silent, though the foreign ministry 
was informed about the Hungarian government and their policies. There were a series 
of detailed reports from the General Consul in Budapest, Ludwig Wäcker-Gotter, 
addressed to Bismarck that plot and explain the various changes in Hungarian 
politics.112 In a report from 2 March 1875 Wäcker-Gotter commented favourably on 
the formation of one Hungarian liberal party under Tisza.113 Hungary and the 
Habsburg Monarchy would be more stable, he reasoned, and this was of primary 
importance for Germany, rather than the plight of fellow German-speakers in faraway 
south-eastern Europe.114  
The municipal laws eventually came up for parliamentary debate in March 
1876. Kálmán Tisza, now Interior and Prime Minister as well as leader of the 
dominant parliamentary party, was personally responsible for the legislation. The 
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proposed laws reduced the jurisdiction of the Universitas Saxonum to cultural matters 
and to administration of its property, rather than any form of political, administrative 
or legal authority. Moreover, the interior minister would have oversight of its 
operations at all times. The Universitas would, however, continue to fund and 
administer schools from the considerable income of Saxon property. Finally, the 
Saxon administrative districts would be redrawn to harmonise with the Hungarian 
Comitat system, meaning a dilution of Saxon control through the incorporation of 
more Romanian and Hungarian speakers.115 Similar standardization and 
rationalization processes were used across Transylvania, including the Székely 
autonomous areas. The majority of Saxon parliamentarians (14 out of 16) were 
determined to fight the legislation, even though there was an overwhelming Magyar 
majority in parliament and no chance of stopping its adoption.116  
In the debate Baussnern began his speech stating that in the Hungarian 
parliament there was no observance of law (Gesetzachtung) or feeling for rights 
(Rechtsgefühl).117 These were sensitive topics for the legal-minded, combative 
Hungarian politicians – of whatever political stripe – and Baussnern was called to 
order by the Speaker of the House. When he continued, Baussnern asserted that the 
Saxon nation’s existence was contained in the laws and associated promises. These 
were not being upheld or kept, according to Baussnern, since, in contravention of the 
laws from 1791, 1848 and 1868 guaranteeing Saxon political and territorial integrity; 
Hungarian parliament and law were dismembering the Königsboden. His arguments 
and Saxon opposition in parliament were to no avail. Once the law came into effect, 
Friedrich Wächter, who had prominently supported and voted for the law, received 
his reward: the post of Saxon Count and Hermannstadt lord lieutenant. He thus also 
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became head of the surviving Universitas Saxonum, a poignant snub to the 
campaigners against the 1876 Law. 
The parliamentary debate about the Königsboden law was followed by the 
German consul Wäcker-Gotter and covered in a report dated 25 March 1876.118 
Wäcker-Gotter expressed some sympathy for the Saxon plight. He described the 
Saxon speeches as ‘uncommonly passionate’ and opined that ‘certainly what is 
happening to them is unjust’. Nevertheless, Wäcker-Gotter balanced these sympathies 
with the acknowledgement that historical privileges had to fall in the interests of 
modern state development. In particular the old Königsboden administrative territorial 
divisions were described as ‘geographically impractical’ and ‘parcels and enclaves’. 
In conclusion he pondered how the Saxons would fare outside of their ‘medieval 
bulwark’. As a minority, perhaps their education and wealth would make them leaders 
of the other nationalities. Indeed, the Saxons may even ‘increase in power and 
influence’. Overall Wäcker-Gotter presents a balanced assessment of the law and 
certainly does not demonstrate overly strong support for the Saxons. Clearly the 
German government had no intention of intervening in a domestic matter, especially 
for a region where continued stability was the priority. 
After the passage of the 1876 municipal law, Teutsch wrote bitterly to 
Treitschke about the end of Saxon local autonomy. Privately, Teutsch continued to 
want an end to the dualist system.119 Treitschke was more circumspect in his replies. 
In particular, he was worried about the instability in the Balkans where an uprising 
against the Ottoman Empire was unfolding. In a letter dated 5 August 1876 he stated 
his belief that it would be unpatriotic to write about Bismarck’s foreign policy, 
especially at a time of changing alliances and the possibility of a Balkan War.120 
However, in his later letter of 2 December 1876 Treitschke wrote that it was now 
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finally time for the German press to fight the ‘arrogance of the Magyars’.121 As ever, 
Treitschke was balancing between two positions: on the one hand, non-intervention 
for the sake of regional security and German diplomatic interests; on the other hand, 
intervention to aid fellow German-speakers and to protect the threatened Deutschtum 
in the East. In any event, the next sustained campaign in Germany to support the 
Saxon cause occurred in 1881 with the formation of the Allgemeiner Deutscher 
Schulverein (ADS) in Berlin, which also foundered on official silence and general 
public indifference.122 
 
     IV 
 
After the fight against the 1876 Königsboden law there were many Saxons who 
believed continued struggle was useless and that an agreement with Hungary was 
needed. Baussnern was now counselling reconciliation with the Hungarian 
government.123 He stood down from his Mediasch parliamentary seat in April 1878, 
since he had been elected on the platform of opposition to the government. In his 
resignation speech Baussnern stated that after the unsuccessful fight against the 
Königsboden law it was time to ‘finally make peace’ with the Magyars.124  Baussnern 
even opined that perhaps a compromise in the municipal autonomy question would 
have been better than hard opposition – this from one of its strongest advocates who 
had even contemplated going to jail for the Saxon cause! For Baussnern, the 
instability in the Balkans and the military actions of Russia were of overwhelming 
importance. The real threat to Saxon existence, according to Baussnern, came from 
the Slavs and the best Saxon policy was friendship and solidarity with the Magyars. 
Baussnern was immediately re-elected to parliament in nearby Agnetheln as a 
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government candidate. He then sat with and supported the Tisza government in 
parliament over the next decades. For Baussnern, the signing of the dual alliance 
between Germany and Austria-Hungary on 7 October 1879 was the culmination of his 
principal political goal and affirmation for his recent switch to the government ranks. 
By 1889 Baussnern could assert that ‘the Magyars in Austria-Hungary are the 
strongest and most secure support for the German alliance’ and that the only means to 
secure the existence of the Saxons was through the Hungarian state idea.125 While 
Baussnern supported and served the Hungarian government and state, he did so as a 
Saxon and German.126  
Teutsch, too, was starting to move away from oppositional tactics. In 1882, 
after the events surrounding the ADS, Teutsch spoke with the Hungarian cultural and 
education Minister Ágoston Trefort about the need for peace. Throughout the mid to 
late 1880s Teutsch attempted to bring about some understanding with the Hungarian 
government, though Tisza’s considerable presence proved a stumbling block.127 In the 
course of the 1880s, Karl Wolff, who had now become one of the acknowledged 
Saxon leaders both as editor of the SDT and as a parliamentarian from 1881, also 
moved from political opposition towards a more conciliatory position. He resigned 
from the editorship of the SDT in 1885 to become the director of the Hermannstädter 
Allgemeine Sparkassa (Hermannstadt General Savings Bank), then left parliament in 
1887. Eventually Teutsch, Wolff and Baussnern (the latter from the government 
benches) began working behind the scenes for an understanding with the Hungarian 
government and a unified Saxon stance of reconciliation, which was achieved at the 
1890 Saxon Day.128   
Many of the individuals in this article began their political careers with Saxon 
defence, opposition to the Hungarian government and desire for German support, then 
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moved gradually to an acceptance of the existing conditions and resignation at the 
Saxon position. The reasoning varied according to each individual depending on their 
own mix of belief in common German culture, political possibilities, geopolitical 
considerations and widespread indifference to German-Transylvanian Saxon links. 
Teutsch held to his pro-German convictions the longest and had the closest personal 
connection with Imperial Germany, but eventually accepted the situation (and 
Imperial German indifference) – as did Karl Wolff. Similar processes were occurring 
in Imperial Germany amongst the sympathisers and advocates for the Saxons. 
Wattenbach retained an interest in Saxon affairs and revisited Teutsch in 1881. 
Shortly afterwards he became involved in the formation of the ADS and its initial 
campaign to aid the Transylvanian Saxons. His final published piece in the late 1890s 
was a review of a book edited by Friedrich Teutsch, who had been his lodger while a 
student in Heidelberg. He called the recent history of the Saxons ‘a history of 
suffering’ but also acknowledged that both externally and internally the Saxons now 
accepted dualism and had to make the best of the situation.129 Treitschke, too, 
continued to be interested in Transylvania, visiting in 1887. He later thanked Teutsch, 
writing that ‘it was, for me, an inexpressible joy to see the best Germans of Austria, 
there, in the far Carpathian lands’.130 However, he did not publicly advocate the 
Saxon cause strongly after his initial attempts in the mid 1870s.  
The dualist system and the unification of Germany brought about fundamental 
changes to Saxon politics. Hungarian political dominance and potential aid from 
Imperial Germany became fixed points in the Saxon political matrix. German state 
and diplomatic pragmatism allied to a general public indifference meant, after initial 
hope and a push for support, there was little chance of concrete benefits or any 
alleviation of the Saxon situation from Imperial Germany.131  Yet notions of German 
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solidarity did not disappear after its failure as a political tactic. Abstract ideas of a 
common shared culture with the wider German-speaking world persisted, though now 
divorced from the official policies of the German state. Vague pan-Germanism found 
some followers, especially around Kronstadt and the ‘Green’ movement, in the last 
decade of the nineteenth century, partly in response to the conciliatory stance at the 
1890 Saxon Day. The ‘Blacks’, mostly based in Hermannstadt, continued to counsel 
conciliation. Others, including Baussnern, gradually assimilated into the Hungarian 
elite. Thus the German nationalist element in Saxon politics changed and transformed, 
waxed and waned, seemed all-important for some or irrelevant for others. It was one 
of the many factors and possible tendencies for Saxons as they adjusted to the post 
1867-71 situation: subsumed within a powerful Hungary, detached from other 
German-speakers within the Habsburg empire, neglected by an acquiescent Monarch 
in Vienna, subjected to demographic and economic pressures, then shorn of autonomy 
and largely ignored by Imperial Germany. The period in the wake of the dualist 
settlement and the unification of Germany was a turning point in the slow emergence 
of Saxon self-perception as an embattled minority on the borderlands of Western 
civilization.   																																																								
1 Place names can be a contentious issue in Central and Eastern Europe scholarship. In this article, for 
readability, at the first mention the place name will be given in the form German/Romanian/Hungarian 
and thereafter the German version will be used. Some place names normally not given in German will 
be in Hungarian or Romanian.  For towns and cities with a commonly used English place name, then 
English will be used. The decisions on place names are based solely on readability and convenience.  
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